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Collecting to the Core — International Relations
by Jeremy Darrington (Politics Librarian, Princeton University; Political Science Editor, Resources for College Libraries)
<jdarring@princeton.edu>
Column Editor: Anne Doherty (Resources for College Libraries Project Editor, CHOICE/ACRL) <adoherty@ala-choice.org>
Column Editor’s Note: The “Collecting
to the Core” column highlights monographic
works that are essential to the academic library within a particular discipline, inspired
by the Resources for College Libraries bibliography (online at http://www.rclweb.net).
In each essay, subject specialists introduce
and explain the classic titles and topics that
continue to remain relevant to the undergraduate curriculum and library collection. Disciplinary trends may shift, but some classics
never go out of style. — AD

F

or most of its history, the predominant
concern of the study of international
relations (IR) has been to analyze and
explain the nature of the international system
of states and their interactions, particularly
why states frequently engage in violent conflicts and war. The field of IR has produced
many ambitious attempts at building theories
to explain these interactions, and the debate
has been vigorous and wide-ranging. While
the literature of IR theory is voluminous, two
seminal works by Kenneth Waltz stand out as
classics that belong in every political science
collection. Waltz’s 1959 Man, the State, and
War and his Theory of International Politics,
written two decades later, had a profound
impact on the subsequent scholarship of IR.1-2
Waltz’s arguments were concise and forceful
and strongly shaped the contours of the debate
in IR for more than two decades, influencing
a generation of IR scholars. These works
continue to occupy a prominent place in most
introductory IR courses.
In Man, the State, and War, Waltz pioneered the application of “levels of analysis” in
explaining the causes of war and international
relations more generally. Waltz posited that
explanations of war could be grouped at three
distinct levels or “images,” as he called them.
“First image” explanations of war focus on
human nature and individual psychology.
Explanations at this level argue that war is a
result of human selfishness, greed, evil, miscalculation, or other individual factors. “Second
image” theories look instead to the internal
structure of states to explain war. For example,
wars may be caused by despotic or imperialist
states looking to expand their territory, by states
attempting to overcome internal strife by uniting against an external enemy, or by domestic
political pressures that may make it costly for
states to pursue peaceful diplomatic solutions.
Without dismissing the contributions of
explanations at these levels, Waltz forcefully
argued that they were incomplete without a
consideration of the international environment
in which states operate, his “third image.” For
Waltz, states exist in an anarchic international
system. It is anarchic, because there is no uni-
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versal government to enforce a system of law
or compel obedience to a set of shared rules or
norms of behavior. In this Hobbesian state of
nature, each sovereign state is forced to rely
on its own power and capabilities to secure its
interests. In a system of many sovereign states
with competing interests, conflict leading to
war becomes inevitable, because there is no
global authority to prevent some states from
using force to achieve their aims. Since the
preeminent desire of all states is to ensure
their own survival, all states must account for
this existential threat and prepare accordingly.
Of course, this insight was not new. In explaining the origins of the Peloponnesian War,
Thucydides argued more than 2,000 years ago
that the “growth of the power of Athens, and the
alarm which this inspired in Sparta, made war
inevitable.”3 However, Waltz’s point was
precisely that anarchy
is the most important
and enduring feature
of the international
system, and he traced
attention to its consequences through the
writings of numerous
statesmen and philosophers, including
Thucydides, Rousseau, Machiavelli, and Clausewitz. The first
and second levels of analysis can explain the
forces driving states’ interests and policies, but
without considering the effect of international
anarchy, “it is impossible to assess their importance or predict their results.”4 Furthermore,
failing to consider the international environment leads to erroneous conclusions about
preventing war, essentially saying “To end war,
improve men; or: To end war, improve states.”5
However, as long as there is the possibility that
some men or states may not improve and will
choose to resort to force to accomplish their
goals, all states will be forced to consider war
as an option to ensure their survival.
In Theory of International Politics, Waltz
extended this argument into a more ambitious
attempt at theorizing the major patterns of
international politics. Waltz sought to explain
various “laws” of state behavior by formulating
explanatory theories rooted in the structure of
the international system. Much of Waltz’s
argument revolved around defining the concepts of system and structure and showing the
necessity for systemic theories in explaining
international relations. Waltz defined a system
as a set of interacting units or parts (in this
case states) and a structure, which he defined
as a set of conditions or forces that limit the
variety of behaviors and outcomes that occur
in the system. In social and political systems,
structure constrains behavior indirectly through

processes of socialization and competition
among the units. As the units independently
act and react to one another in a shared environment, their interactions generate pressures
that promote a similarity of behaviors and
outcomes — for example, individuals may be
ostracized for violating group norms or firms
may go bankrupt if they fail to emulate the
practices of successful competitors.
Structures thus define the arrangement
of the units and their relation to each other
in the system. In the international system,
Waltz argued, three key elements define this
structure. First, the organization of the units is
decentralized and anarchic; in the absence of
a central authority “whether those units live,
prosper, or die depends on their own efforts.”6
Second, the principal units of the system are
states, which are functionally similar, even
though their interests
and capabilities differ
widely. States are not
the only actors that
matter in international
politics, Waltz argues,
but they are the major
ones, and it is their
interactions that drive
the structural dynamics of the international
system. Third, the structure is defined by how
power is distributed across the units in the system. Changes in the number of great powers
(e.g., a change from a bipolar to a multipolar
system) will change our expectations about
state behavior and the outcomes of international interactions. For Waltz, the structure of the
anarchic international system produces regular
patterns of behavior: to ensure their survival,
states will seek to maximize their power and
will seek to counter the rise of potential aggressors or hegemonic states, leading to a balance
of power in the system.
Waltz’s work formed the basis for what
came to be known in IR as structural realism or
neorealism. His emphasis on structural forces
shaping state behavior thus distinguished his
work from the classical realist tradition in IR.
This tradition — exemplified by Hans Morgenthau’s classic Politics among Nations, first
published in 1948 — was also concerned with
anarchy and state power, but it traced the source
of power politics in the international realm to
the fundamental role of human nature.7 “Human nature, in which the laws of politics have
their roots, has not changed” since antiquity,
Morgenthau declared, and “the tendency to
dominate, in particular, is an element of all
human associations.”8 Furthermore, while society “restrains aspirations for individual power
within the national community,” it “encourages
continued on page 77
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and glorifies the tendencies of the great mass
of the population, frustrated in its individual
power drives, to identify itself with the nation’s
struggle for power on the international scene.”9
In contrast, Waltz’s structural realism was
able to explain recurrent patterns of international outcomes without the need to assume
a universal lust for power or to examine the
character of individual states. The structure
of the international system “constrains [states]
from some actions [and] disposes them toward
others.”10 To take a current example, in Waltz’s
theoretical framework, Iran’s drive for nuclear
weapons is not the irrational policy of “mad
mullahs” belonging to an “axis of evil,” but
rather an attempt to assuage its own security
fears. “In no other region of the world does
a lone, unchecked nuclear state exist. It is
Israel’s nuclear arsenal, not Iran’s desire for
one, that has contributed most to the current
crisis.”11 Waltz argues that letting Iran get
the bomb would produce stability, because “by
reducing imbalances in military power, new
nuclear states generally produce more regional
and international stability, not less…Power,
after all, begs to be balanced.”12
Structural realism was not and is not the
only approach to IR, of course. Another prominent approach, liberalism, emphasized the possibilities for harmony and cooperation between
states facilitated through international organizations, institutions, and laws. Disparaged
during the interwar period as naively utopian
and dangerously unrealistic (epitomized by the
failure of the League of Nations to prevent
WWII), liberalism saw a major resurgence in
the 1960s and ’70s that was driven by interest
in increasing economic ties between Western
states, the growing importance of non-state actors (like NGOs and multinational companies),
and the deepening political and economic integration among erstwhile enemies in Europe.
This “new” liberalism (neoliberalism) argued
that Western states existed in a condition of
“complex interdependence” characterized by
a web of economic, social, and other ties that
diminished the importance of military security
and the relevance of force as a policy option.13
But the forceful articulation of anarchy’s
central importance in Theory of International
Politics influenced even liberal writers. Robert Keohane — creator, with Joseph Nye, of
the concept of complex interdependence —
advanced a modified liberal argument in his
influential 1984 After Hegemony that accepted
structural realism’s key assumptions about
anarchy, the centrality of states, and the role of
power.14 But in contrast to realist arguments,
he showed that cooperation among self-interested states is possible through international
institutions or regimes (“sets of principles,
norms, rules, and decision-making procedures”
in a specific area like trade or aviation).15 Realists argued that these kinds of cooperative
arrangements are created by dominant powers
to reinforce their own power and interests,
but that in the absence of a hegemon, they

break down as security fears trump interest in
cooperation. Using both logic and historical
evidence, Keohane argued that this pessimism
wasn’t warranted. Even after hegemony, regimes persist because states find them useful in
lowering the costs of negotiating, monitoring,
and enforcing mutually beneficial agreements.
There were other critiques of Waltz’s structural realist theory, many of which attacked
realism for an overly simplistic view of international politics that ignored other important
actors and forces at work. They were right, of
course, but Waltz never argued that realism
provides a complete picture of international
relations. Rather, he argued that theories are
necessarily abstractions from reality, simplifications “that lay bare the essential elements
in play and indicate the necessary relations
of cause and interdependency — or suggest
where to look for them.”16 And as events in
Ukraine have recently demonstrated, one of
those “essential elements in play” is an anarchic international system where “the strong do
what they can and the weak suffer what they
must.”17
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